In any case the Ilyushin sitting at this airfield at 06:08 could not be the one from Rostov-on-Don that transported the Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ to Kursk: the ‘3X2’ crossed the border around 06.00 and thus could not have been flown to Kursk by 06:08. It could not be determined for certain if the TELAR ‘3X2’ was transported by air.

In summary, the investigation was unable to establish what happened to the TELAR after it arrived in Russia.

This brings us to the crew. The orders concerning the first convoy, which included Buk TELAR ‘3X2’, contain no information about the accompanying crew. Documents from the second convoy show that as of 15 July at least 193 military personnel belonging to the 53rd were deployed to the same border region. They must have arrived there before Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ crossed the border on 17 July, and for that reason they were included in the investigation of the crew. These 193 individuals were mentioned by name. Most belonged to the 1st battalion, while a smaller number were part of the 2nd and 3rd battalions.

These include members of the staff, such as Commander Muchkaev. Although it is plausible that Muchkaev knew about his brigade’s deployment of the Buk TELAR by virtue of his position, there are no concrete indications of this. Nor is there any telecom data. It is not possible to confirm Muchkaev’s presence in the border region around the time of the downing of MH17. It was not possible to question him during the criminal proceedings because Russia would not allow it.

All military personnel of the 53rd AAMB for whom there were indications that they may have been in the border region when the Buk TELAR was deployed were investigated further. Of that number, 35 officers were considered capable, on the basis of their rank and position, of operating a Buk TELAR. Seven other soldiers were found to have worked as a Buk TELAR operator or as the driver of a Buk vehicle. These findings do not, however, rule out the possibility that there were other officers with the same skills, or operators or drivers, in the border region.

In the course of the investigation a number of current and former members of the 53rd AAMB were tracked down and examined. Those individuals also provided information without knowing that it would end up in the hands of the investigation team. This was the only reason that several of them stated that they had been in Ukraine in the summer of 2014 during their time with the 53rd AAMB. Investigators were unable to confirm this information through direct questioning. One of them said that he was very afraid and unwilling to take any more risks. He was unwilling or unable to say anything about the crew.

There are also chat records involving (former) members of the 53rd AAMB, which point to the presence of a number of military personnel of the 3rd battalion in the Russian-Ukrainian border region in July 2014. They reportedly left separately for a secret destination. These unnamed contract soldiers were under the command of an officer who was mentioned by rank and name. The investigation revealed the identity of this officer. At the time he was a member of the personal staff of the brigade commander Muchkaev. It could not be determined whether this officer was present in the border region on 17 July 2014. Notably, this officer appears in photos on social media after 17 July wearing two military decorations: one for the development of, and combat operations with, a Buk system, and another for extraordinary service with the Russian security service FSB.

Information provided by a witness points in another direction. This witness said to have heard from someone in the Russian army that four people attached to the 53rd AAMB were involved in the downing of the Boeing. These four comprised the crew of the Buk. The witness in question mentions two names. The examining magistrate investigated the witness and determined, on the basis of his or her position, that he or she would have been capable of obtaining this information.

The two names given match those of two officers of the 53rd AAMB. It has been established that at least one of them was deployed in the border region in the summer of 2014. Both were members of the 2nd company of the 2nd battalion.

In an information report by the SBU, one of the officers named by the witness was mentioned as a crew member who had gone drinking with the separatist Tsemakh after the downing of MH17. A witness confirmed this, but did not name the crew member in question. Tsemakh was examined by the JIT on multiple occasions. He disputes having had any contact with the crew, and denies any involvement in the downing of MH17. The investigation yielded insufficient indications pointing to Tsemakh’s criminal involvement.

In summary, a total of three names of officers emerge who may have been involved in the downing of MH17. However, to date the investigation has not been able to find any further confirmation of this. The Russian authorities have refused to answer any questions about the crew, as they maintain that there was never any Russian Buk TELAR in eastern Ukraine.

Finally, on 17 July and 25 September 2022 names and photos circulated on Twitter concerning four members of the 2nd battalion who were said to have shot down MH17. The investigation team obtained the information that formed the basis of these tweets. This includes a 2015 personnel list for the 53rd AAMB, which was already known to the JIT, and passport information. On the basis of this information and the findings of its own investigation, the JIT concluded that there were no indications that these four individuals were involved in the downing of MH17.

We will now consider how the Buk TELAR was supplied to the DPR. The court has established that as of mid-May 2014 the Russian Federation and Ukraine were involved in an international armed conflict in eastern Ukraine because the Russian authorities had overall control over the fighting in the DPR. DPR leaders were in close contact with the Russian Presidential Executive Office, Kremlin advisers and the Russian intelligence services. Staff members of these government bodies also came up in the JIT’s investigation into the decision-making process about the provision of the Buk TELAR to the DPR. The main source for this is telecom data involving both intercepted phone conversations from the case file and new conversations. A number of conversations are mentioned in the report, and we will play excerpts from them shortly.

We will discuss the findings of the investigation in chronological order, starting with the arrival of the Russians Girkin and Borodai in eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014, in the immediate wake of the establishment of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (the DPR). On 12 April Girkin crossed into Ukraine from Crimea and was appointed ‘Minister of Defence’. He was followed a short time later by Borodai, who was given the role of ‘Prime Minister’ of the DPR. Both men had previously been involved in the annexation of Crimea, by their own account as advisers of the Russian Sergei Aksyonov, the so-called prime minister of Crimea. While in Ukraine Borodai and Girkin stayed in contact with Aksyonov.

In June 2014 there was heavy fighting between the Ukrainian army and troops of the DPR and other separatists of the Luhansk People’s Republic (the LPR). During this fighting both the DPR and LPR requested heavier weaponry, including better anti-aircraft systems.

For example, Plotnitskiy, the so-called defense minister of the LPR, speaks in Russia in June 2014 with the military intelligence service GRU and asks for heavier air defense weapons to be provided.

Girkin, the minister of defense of the DPR, makes the same request. When his headquarters in Slavyansk, came under fire in early June 2014, Girkin told Aksyonov that they needed ‘decent anti-aircraft systems with trained personnel’.

The investigation carried out shows that from the second half of July 2014 several Buk-TELARs have been delivered to the separatists, including the Buk-TELAR that shot down flight MH17.

The investigation was able to shed some light on Russian decision-making process regarding the delivery of heavier anti-aircraft systems to the separatists.

When Girkin requested for ‘decent anti-aircraft systems with trained personnel’, Aksyonov replied to Girkin that on Tuesday he was where he needed to be given the situation, that a joint coordination centre had been set up, and that the necessary documents for the support were already being drawn up. He said that he still needed to wait because ‘they’ were in different places and would be away for two days.

It is known from another conversation that Aksyonov was in Sochi on Tuesday 3 June. According to the Kremlin, Putin was there on that day as well. On 5 and 6 June, Putin was in France for the D-Day commemoration, together with various world leaders.

MH17 Witness Appeal and Trial Information

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